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ABSTRACT 
  In this Article, we contend that the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) is 
premature. Developing countries are struggling to adjust to the 
heightened standards of intellectual property protection required by 
the TRIPS Agreement of 1994. With TRIPS, at least, these countries 
obtained side payments (in the form of trade concessions) to offset the 
rising costs of knowledge products. A free-standing instrument, such 
as the SPLT, would shrink the remaining flexibilities in the TRIPS 
Agreement with no side payments and no concessions to the catch-up 
strategies of developing countries at different stages of technological 
advancement. 
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  More controversially, we argue that a deep harmonization would 
boomerang against even its developed country promoters by creating 
more problems than it would solve. There is no vision of a properly 
functioning patent system for the developed world that commands 
even the appearance of a consensus. The evidence shows, instead, that 
the worldwide intellectual property system has entered a brave new 
scientific epoch, in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas 
about how best to treat a daunting array of new technologies. The 
proposals for reconciling the needs of different sectors, such as 
information technology and biotechnology, pose hard, unresolved 
issues at a time when the costs of litigation are rising at the expense of 
profits from innovation. These difficulties are compounded by the 
tendency of universities to push patenting up stream, generating new 
rights to core methodologies and research tools. As new approaches 
to new technologies emerge in different jurisdictions, there is a need to 
gather empirical evidence to determine which, if any, of these still 
experimental solutions are preferable over time. 
  Our argument need not foreclose other less intrusive options and 
measures surveyed in the Article that can reduce the costs of delaying 
harmonization. However, the international community should not 
rush to freeze legal obligations regarding the protection of intellectual 
property. It should wait until economists and policymakers better 
understand the dynamics of innovation and the role that patent rights 
play in promoting progress and until there are mechanisms in place to 
keep international obligations responsive to developments in science, 
technology, and the organization of the creative community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Proposals to further harmonize domestic patent laws at the 
international level1 have understandably attracted considerable 
attention.2 As intellectual property continues to grow as a component 
of global trade, the costs of worldwide protection and enforcement 
have soared.3 Patent holders accordingly seek ways to acquire and 
maintain their exclusive rights more efficiently in an integrated world 
marketplace.4 They are also increasingly frustrated by the need to 
pursue multiple actions for infringement in cross-border disputes.5 
Under the bedrock principle of territoriality, successive litigations can 
trigger different applications of domestic and international patent 
norms to the same set of facts and can lead to conflicting judgments 
and arguably irreconcilable outcomes.6 
 
 1. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. (WIPO), Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, 
Report, at 1–2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005); WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of 
Patents, Information on Certain Recent Developments in Relation to the Draft Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2–3, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 17, 2004); WIPO, Standing Comm. on 
the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/2 
(Sept. 30, 2003). 
 2. See generally WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), 
Geneva, Switz., Mar. 1–3, 2006 [hereinafter WIPO Open Forum], available at http://www. 
wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (hosting the presentation of 
papers, lectures, and speeches on the international harmonization of patent law). 
 3. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. The 
European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 53 (2000); Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be 
Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 473 (1996). 
 4. See infra notes 8–19 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop. (AIPPI), Question Q174—
Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in the Case of Cross-border Infringement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 2003/I Y.B. 827–28, Oct. 25–28, 2003, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/ 
resolutions/Q174_E.pdf (recognizing the need for a fairer and more efficient method of 
resolving cross-border controversies); European Max-Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in 
Intellectual Prop., Exclusive Jurisdiction and Cross-Border IP (Patent) Infringement: Suggestions 
for Amendment of the Brussels I Regulation, in 29(5) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 195, 195–96 
(2007) (suggesting the need to amend the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, EC Regulation No 44/2001, to improve the 
efficiency of transnational dispute resolution). 
 6. See, e.g., David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the 
European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 550 (1996) (observing that “the English and 
German courts reached opposite conclusions in parallel litigation in the two countries” (citing 
Improver Corp. v. Remington Prods. Inc., 21 IIC 572 (1990), 24 IIC 838 (1993), [1993] GRUR 
Int. 242 (F.R.G.), and Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181 
(Eng. Ch. 1989))). On the validity and infringement of the patent protecting Fosamax, see 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
holding that the patent is invalid because it was obvious, and Merck & Co. Inc.’s Patents, [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 1545, [1]–[73] (Eng.), holding that the patent is invalid because it was both 
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Governments have responded to the upswing in patent 
applications by searching for techniques that would allow them to 
share examination responsibilities and costs.7 The Patent Cooperation 
Treaty8 and various regional agreements, such as the Convention on 
the Grant of European Patents, embody many important procedural 
advances.9 These instruments, however, are seldom the product of 
true harmonization exercises, in part because the outcome of 
examinations conducted within these frameworks is typically a set of 
individual national patents that remain separately enforceable under 
local laws.10 In 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
 
obvious and lacked novelty. On the importance of allocating a jurisdiction for a patent dispute, 
see generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002), 
and Mariano Municoy, Symposium, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models 
Developed by the Hague Conference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries and the 
Relationship of Private Parties, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 342 (2005), and see also Case C-
593/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, [2007] F.S.R. 5 (E.C.J. 2006) (questioning whether 
conflicting national judgments of validity or infringement should be considered 
“irreconcilable”). 
In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seems torn by the 
tension between territoriality and the global exercise of patent rights. Compare, e.g., Voda v. 
Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “considerations of comity, judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness, and other exceptional circumstances constitute compelling 
reasons to decline [supplemental] jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(c)” over foreign 
patents), with AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(endorsing de facto extraterritorial application of domestic software patents to conduct 
occurring in countries that reject software patents), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007). 
 7. Bruce A. Lehman, Addressing the Crisis of the Global Patent System, JAPAN ECON. 
CURRENTS, Jan. 2005, at 5, 5–6, available at http://www.keidanren-usa.org/publications/currents/ 
docs/JEC_Jan05_132K.pdf. 
 8. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 9. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. In 
addition, the European Community (EC) is considering the development of a region-wide 
community patent. See John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 341, 343 (2004); Hanns Ullrich, National, European and Community Patent Protection: Time 
for Reconsideration 14–22 (European Univ. Inst., Dep’t of Law, EUI Working Papers, LAW 
No. 2006/41, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963759. 
Other nations are contemplating or have enacted similar measures. See Agreement Revising the 
Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property 
Organization, tit. I, Feb. 24, 1999, available at http://www.oapi.wipo.net/doc/en/bangui_ 
agreement.pdf; Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs within the Framework of the African 
Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), 2, § 1, Dec. 10, 1982, available at 
http://www.aripo.org/Documents/Protocols/harare_agreement.pdf (last amended Aug. 13, 2004); 
Marcelo J. Vernengo, Kees de Joncheere & Enrique Fefer, Advances in Pharmaceutical Market 
Integration in Mercosur and Other Latin American Countries, 32 DRUG INFO. J. 831, 834–35 
(1998). 
 10. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 9. The Agreement 
Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual 
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS),11 which 
incorporated the 1967 text of the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property,12 took a major step toward substantive patent 
law harmonization. It established a set of minimum international 
standards of protection for some 150 participating countries.13 Yet the 
Agreement, which did not attempt to create a uniform or deeply 
harmonized global patent regime, left ample room for national 
variations and approaches, which are often collectively deemed “the 
TRIPS flexibilities.”14 
The effort by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) to organize a thorough exploration of the possibilities for 
further harmonization is therefore a welcome development to much 
of the patent community.15 Under the aegis of WIPO’s Standing 
Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), the Draft Substantive 
 
Property Organization, supra note 9, however, does grant a regional patent. A draft European 
Patent Litigation Agreement is also under consideration. Draft Agreement on the 
Establishment of a European Patent Litigation System, Feb. 16, 2004, available at http://www. 
european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/agreement_draft.pdf. 
 11. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
 12. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967); TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 11, art. 2.1. 
 13. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 27–34. 
 14. See id., art. 1.1; see also John Sulston, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on 
the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): International Patent Law Harmonization, 
Development and Policy Space for Flexibility (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (discussing the TRIPS flexibilities). See 
generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE 
BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE 
BOOK] (providing background and technical information on the TRIPS Agreement); J.H. 
Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS 
Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (C. M. Correa & A. A. Yusuf eds., 1998). 
 15. See, e.g., Daeshik Jeh, Director, Patent Examination Policy Team, Korean Intellectual 
Property Office, Presentation Before the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty (SPLT): International Patent Law Harmonization and Development: The 
Experience of the Republic of Korea (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (discussing the benefits and desirability 
of harmonization); Kenji Kamata, Japan Intellectual Property Association, Presentation Before 
the WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT): The Rationale 
and Benefits of Patent Law Harmonization (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (same). 
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Patent Law Treaty (SPLT)16 represents an attempt “to pursue a ‘deep 
harmonization’ of both the law and practice” concerning not just the 
drafting, filing, and examination of patent applications, but also the 
cornerstone requirements of patentability.17 Ideally, member states 
would agree to adopt identical rules concerning what constitutes a 
novel and useful invention, when a technical advance meets the 
requirement for an “inventive step” (nonobviousness), and how much 
information must be revealed by the patent disclosure. “Deep 
harmonization” would also entail agreement on priority of 
inventorship (whether a patent is awarded to the first to invent or the 
first to file) and whether inventors will be accorded a grace period 
permitting publication for some period prior to filing.18 Notably, 
through the efforts of the so-called Group of Friends of 
Development,19 this initiative is being tested against the drive for a 
more development-friendly agenda at WIPO, with a view to ensuring 
 
 16. WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
(SPLT), supra note 1. 
 17. Karen M. Hauda, The Role of the United States in World-Wide Protection of Industrial 
Property, in THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 89, 97 (Frank Gotzen ed., 2003). 
 18. Id. (“This approach was adopted in an attempt to avoid the controversial hurdles to 
agreement that were found in the past.”); see also Philippe Baechtold, The Future Role of WIPO 
in the Area of Industrial Property, in THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
GLOBAL MARKET OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 139, 143 (”[T]here are 
other issues that require further reflection . . . [including] the question of patentable subject 
matter, . . . the requirement of technical character of the invention, the exceptions from 
patentability, the introduction of some form of grace period and the issue of equivalents.”). 
 19. In the Fall of 2004, the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization invited comment on a proposal presented by the Group of Friends of 
Development (led by Argentina and Brazil) for the establishment of a Development Agenda 
for WIPO. WIPO, Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a 
Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo. 
int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. Since then, many other 
proposals have been presented and discussed. E.g., WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals 
Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Report of the Third Session, at 1, PCDA/3/3 (June 
11, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_3/pcda_3_3.pdf; WIPO, 
Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Proposal for a 
Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda, PCDA/2/2 (June 
23, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_2/pcda_2_2.pdf; see also 
James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 9, at 3–4 (2004), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/ 
2004DLTR0009.pdf (criticizing the “one size fits all” approach of WIPO and the TRIPS 
agreement). 
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consideration of the needs of all nations, whatever their technological 
capacities may be.20 
Despite the promise such an effort holds, we believe that it is 
unwise to move to deep substantive harmonization so quickly after 
the TRIPS Agreement elevated patent standards universally.21 These 
standards challenged the technological catch-up strategies of all the 
developing countries and saddled them with social costs they are 
struggling to absorb.22 As the endless controversies surrounding 
pharmaceutical patents demonstrate,23 higher standards of global 
protection—whatever their incentive effects24—also generate severe 
and unintended distributional consequences for the developing 
 
 20. WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, 
Proposal for a Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development Agenda, 
supra note 19; WIPO, Provisional Comm. on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development 
Agenda, Report of the Third Session, supra note 19, at 1. 
 21. For developing countries, the patent standards (articles 27–34) of the TRIPS 
Agreement became generally operational on January 1, 2000. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, 
art. 65.2; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the 
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 444 (2000). Developing countries, 
however, that did not previously allow product patents on pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products were given another five years to cover them, subject to a “mail-box” 
provision for patents arising in the meantime. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts 65.4, 70.8–
70.9 (mailbox and minimum exclusive marketing rights). 
 22. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 159–62 (2002), available at http://www. 
iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR]; CARLOS M. 
CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5–44 (2000); Reichman, supra note 14, at 77–92. 
 23. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India—Novartis, Patent Law, and Access 
to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 541 (2007) (discussing Novartis’s effort to patent 
Gleevec); Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 544–46 (2007) (noting Merck’s objection to Thailand’s compulsory licensing of an 
antiretroviral medication). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The 
Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
394, 408–10 (Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (discussing how patents function 
as obstacles both to prevent generic products from entering the market and to prevent 
competition that may lower costs). 
 24. See, e.g., Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri & Alphonso Gambardella, Markets for 
Technology, Intellectual Property Rights and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 23, at 321, 325–26 (“Strong patent protection provides incentives to codify and 
organize new knowledge in ways that are meaningful and useful to others.”); Alan O. Sykes, 
TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 
48 (2002) (“The ultimate wisdom of measures that relax intellectual property protection for 
pharmaceuticals in developing countries turns on complex matters, including empirical issues 
about which one can only hazard an educated guess.”). 
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world.25 A further round of harmonization will likely aggravate these 
and other unresolved problems without producing any offsetting user 
rights or concessions for these countries. On the contrary, the 
dynamics of TRIPS and the post-TRIPS trade agreements teach that 
even a development-sensitive negotiation process is likely to produce 
an instrument that furthers the interests of developed countries at the 
expense of poorer, less powerful participants.26 
More controversially, we contend that higher levels of 
harmonization will harm even the developed countries, including 
those that are most aggressively pressing for yet another round of 
multilateral intellectual property negotiations. The domestic patent 
laws as currently practiced were largely formulated for the inventions 
of the Industrial Revolution,27 and these laws still reflect the 
technological premises and concepts of the creative sectors as they 
were then structured. Yet in this postindustrial information age, with 
knowledge-intensive inventions emerging from new kinds of research 
institutions, creative entities are organized nonhierarchically and 
along continuously changing lines.28 New players, such as universities 
and scientific research organizations, routinely patent their output, 
and whole new sectors, including biotechnology and information 
 
 25. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2832 (2006) (“Over-reliance on utility maximization ignores 
distributional consequences . . . but intellectual property globalization has made these aspects of 
the provision of basic knowledge goods increasingly difficult to ignore.”); Peter M. Gerhart, 
Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public Goods, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 69, 72 (“[A]lthough institutions like the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
promote an efficient system of global trade and investment, we have found no way to tax those 
who benefit from the efficiency of the global system in order to support those who do not.”); 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast. 
 26. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual 
Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 73, 73–74 (Peter 
K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the tensions between developed and less-developed countries with 
respect to the TRIPS Agreement). 
 27. See generally CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY (2006). 
 28. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information 
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2077–78 (2000); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39–40, 
44–46 (Winter/Spring 2003); Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrum, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: 
Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 133–34 
(Winter/Spring 2003). 
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technology, have emerged.29 Until the operations of these and other 
new technical communities are better understood, there is a greater 
need for legal experimentation at the substantive level than for 
harmonization. In the absence of any international governance 
infrastructure capable of interpreting and amending the law (rather 
than freezing it prematurely), a compelling case can be made for 
delaying deep harmonization until other methods for improving the 
efficiency of a global patent system have been fully explored.30 
Part I of this Article surveys the implications of deep 
harmonization for developing countries, and Part II does likewise for 
developed countries. Part III suggests that the appropriate goal for 
the progressive development of world intellectual property law after 
TRIPS is to nurture an “incipient transnational system of 
innovation,”31 which can, in turn, provide the appropriate template for 
validating global patent norms over time. 
I.  THE LIKELY ADVERSE IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Before moving to the more controversial claim that 
harmonization could boomerang against its developed-country 
advocates, we stress that even a cursory look at the results of the 
TRIPS Agreement reveals the problems harmonization of the type 
envisioned by the SPLT pose for the developing world. Although 
TRIPS specifically leaves room for nations to tailor their laws to their 
internal needs and pace of intellectual advancement,32 experience 
shows that emerging economies are, in fact, greatly challenged by the 
costs and hardship associated with adjusting their development 
 
 29. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property 
Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431, 433 (2004); Arti K. Rai & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 30. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 23, at 3, 17–20. 
 31. Id. at 44. 
 32. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1 (leaving Members “free to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
system and practice”); id. at arts. 7–8 (stressing objectives of promoting innovation and transfer 
of technology “to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge” 
and “the public interest in sectors of vital importance to [Members’] socio-economic and 
technological development”). See generally UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14 
(discussing “flexibilities” within the TRIPS regime). 
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strategies to new legal realities and that successive rounds of 
negotiations tend to reduce the flexibilities available for nations to 
tailor intellectual property law to their own needs.33 
A. The Social Costs of the TRIPS Patent Standards 
In principle, higher standards of patent protection under the 
TRIPS Agreement will provide needed incentives to invest in the 
innovative sectors of some developing economies,34 to make high-
technology products available to local industries, and to promote new 
licensing agreements and direct foreign investments.35 In practice, 
however, their different national and regional capabilities, 
institutions, and endowments limit the developing countries’ 
absorptive capacities and reduce the potential benefits of open 
markets for knowledge goods. This “technology divide” is further 
widened by the high rents exacted by technology exporters.36 
Whether they fall into the high-, medium-, or low-income 
brackets, all the developing countries—except for a small group of 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—that seek to become suppliers 
of knowledge goods must compete on roughly the same normative 
terms and conditions that govern advanced industrialized countries.37 
 
 33. See, e.g., CIPR, supra note 22, at 8–9, 21–27; Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 4–
15; Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 839–42 (2003). For a more optimistic view, see Joseph 
Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The Role of Intellectual 
Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2006). 
 34. See Straus, supra note 33, at 4. 
 35. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 109–42 (2000); Keith E. Maskus, Kamal Saggi & Thitima Puttitanun, Patent Rights 
and International Technology Transfer Through Direct Investment and Licensing, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 265, 265. But see Daniel C.K. Chow, The 
Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in 
4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra note 26, at 187, 187 (stressing 
China’s ability to attract foreign direct investment despite weak intellectual property rights). 
 36. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 227, 229–32 
[hereinafter Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries?]; Carlos M. Correa, Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for Developing 
Countries, 21 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 377–79 (1994) [hereinafter Correa, Trends in Technology 
Transfer]; see also KEITH E. MASKUS, UNCTAD-ICTSD, ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (2004). 
 37. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.1 (requiring that “patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology” if they 
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Although some developing countries have demonstrated considerable 
capacity in certain technological sectors,38 all are struggling to cope 
with the limits TRIPS places on their ability to reverse engineer up-
to-date foreign technologies that were previously unpatented in their 
territories. For example (and especially problematical), the ability to 
produce generic drugs without regard to pharmaceutical patents was 
completely eliminated in 2005.39 For an economy like that of India, 
where the generic drug industry is a significant source of income and 
a key locus of technological development, “fair following” by honest 
means of reverse engineering had been an important strategic 
option.40 
Whether they engage in the production of knowledge goods for 
local consumption or for export purposes, developing countries must 
internalize the TRIPS-mandated intellectual property standards in 
ways that stimulate potentially innovative industrial sectors without 
legally discriminating against foreign competitors.41 They must also 
avoid undermining those less-advanced sectors of their own 
economies that meet local needs for knowledge goods at affordable 
prices. India’s new patent law, for example, reflects the tensions 
between efforts to stimulate the nation’s research-based 
 
meet specified eligibility criteria); id. arts. 65–66. As regards pharmaceutical products in 
particular, see World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration]; Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the Transition 
Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for 
Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WT/IP/C/25 (July 1, 2005). 
LDCs may postpone implementation of other TRIPS obligations, including the duty to 
provide patent protection for products other than pharmaceuticals, until 2013. See Decision of 
the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 
66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WT/IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005). During these 
transition periods, LDCs must continue to respect national treatment and Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) obligations under articles 3–4 of the TRIPS Agreement. See id. para. 5. 
 38. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s 
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923538 (“India 
became a world leader in high-quality generic drug manufacturing.”); Straus, supra note 33, at 
6–8. 
 39. See sources cited supra note 37. 
 40. See Mueller, supra note 38, at 4, 28, 55. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders 
to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
11 (1997) (evaluating “the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on [developing countries’] capacity 
to acquire the knowledge and skills they need to compete on the market for technologically 
advanced products and processes”). 
 41. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 3–4. 
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pharmaceutical sector and efforts to preserve its well-developed 
capacity to supply low-cost drugs for the needy in both domestic and 
foreign markets.42 
At the same time, the foreign technology suppliers’ demands for 
increased rent extraction—combined with refusals to work, refusals 
to deal, and various forms of unchecked anticompetitive conduct—
hamper the efforts of developing-country entrepreneurs to acquire 
high-technology goods on open markets at prices that preserve their 
own comparative advantages.43 These practices also frustrate their 
governments’ ability to attract foreign direct investment and to build 
the infrastructure needed to move to a more competitive position on 
the technological frontier.44 Although the full extent of these barriers 
has been insufficiently studied, it seems that high-tech manufacturers 
in developed countries prefer selling to wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries rather than to potential competitors in developing 
countries. When sales are made to third parties, the net welfare gains 
from technology installation may be offset by the costs of increased 
rent extraction.45 
Moreover, all the developing countries, even those not engaged 
in the production of knowledge goods, must maintain patent offices 
and create mechanisms that enable foreign patent owners to enforce 
their rights—a costly and burdensome operation.46 How they 
accomplish this task will seriously affect their internal development 
 
 42. See Mueller, supra note 23, at 541–43; Mueller, supra note 38, at 55–61. 
 43. See John Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN 
KNOWLEDGE 57, 61 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) (stressing the difficulties of entry—
”compounded by the international IP system”—into markets “dominated by multinational 
oligopolies”); Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369–
70 (2002) (discussing differing opinions on local work requirements between developed and 
developing countries); cf. Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital 
Information Works in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 23, at 142, 145 (suggesting that similar problems arise in connection with copyrighted 
scientific and educational works). 
 44. See MASKUS, supra note 35, at 119–35; Barton, supra note 43, at 373–74; Correa, Can 
the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, supra note 36, at 
229–32; Correa, Trends in Technology Transfer, supra note 36, at 371–72. 
 45. See, e.g., Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 309, 317–20 (finding increased rent 
extraction following patent strengthening). 
 46. CIPR, supra note 22, at 114. 
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strategies along with their ability to supply such essential public goods 
as education, public health, environmental safety, scientific 
advancement, and a soundly competitive marketplace for goods and 
services.47 
These tensions are linked with, but not necessarily determined 
by, problems of wealth distribution. For example, the TRIPS 
Agreement made assumptions about technological self-sufficiency 
that proved inaccurate and contributed directly to a health crisis over 
much of the globe.48 Although the subsequent Doha Round remedied 
the problem by permitting countries to issue compulsory licenses to 
meet the health needs of nations unable to produce locally needed 
medicines, the Doha Agreement took several years to negotiate and 
its efficacy is yet to be demonstrated.49 
Admittedly, TRIPS gives its Members some leeway to tailor their 
laws to local needs. For example, states can presumably supply their 
own definitions of “inventive step” and determine for themselves the 
technological scope of patent protection.50 They can refuse to patent 
diagnostic, surgical, and therapeutic methods;51 they can exclude from 
 
 47. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 33–35; cf. Chon, supra note 25, at 28–49 
(describing the nation-state as the “best guardian of the domestic welfare bargain” upon which 
the international trading system should not unduly intrude); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing 
Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1090 
(2007) (comparing material interests in intellectual creations and protections to human rights 
interests, such as health, education and free expression). 
 48. See Doha Declaration, supra note 37, para. 6; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 
31(f). The TRIPS Agreement allowed compulsory licensing of patented products in the 
domestic market. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 31. Members lacking the capacity to 
manufacture pharmaceuticals locally, however, could not effectively use compulsory licensing or 
obtain exports under a double compulsory licensing regime. Id., art. 31(f); Doha Declaration, 
supra note 35, para. 6. For a description of the difficulties in providing access to essential 
medicines, see generally Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World 
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005). 
 49. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & JEROME H. REICHMAN, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: LESSONS 
LEARNED SINCE THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH, AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 13 (2007); Abbott, supra note 48, 
at 317 (“Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned about access to medicines were 
disappointed by the complexity of the [Doha Declaration’s implementation], arguing that it 
would be unworkable in practice.”). 
 50. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 27(1), 28. Article 27(1) lists an “inventive 
step” as one of the requirements for patentable subject matter but does not define the term. Id. 
art. 27(1). Article 28 defines scope in terms of the nature of the rights conferred, but the 
Agreement does not set out the breadth of technological terrain a patent right must cover. Id. 
art. 28. 
 51. Id. art. 27(3)(a). 
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patentability inventions required to protect ordre public, morality, 
and human health;52 and they can grant limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred.53 They also have increasing power to order 
compulsory licenses.54 These flexibilities allow developing countries 
considerable policy space in which to maximize the benefits and 
minimize the social costs of adopting the international minimum 
standards. But addressing these flexibilities is expensive and requires 
a sophisticated legal infrastructure. Taken together with the costs of 
complying with the obligations TRIPS mandates, the burden on 
developing countries is formidable.55 To make matters worse, these 
same countries must increasingly also deal with pressures to provide 
the higher, TRIPS-plus levels of intellectual property protection 
embodied in bilateral or regional trade agreements.56 
B. Shrinking the TRIPS Flexibilities 
Against this background, any form of deep harmonization 
through the SPLT that is likely to win the support of the developed 
countries seems certain to erode whatever flexibilities the developing 
countries still retain under the TRIPS Agreement and under 
subsequently negotiated TRIPS-plus Free Trade Agreements 
(including their Most Favored Nation implications57). Consider, for 
example, the eligibility requirement of an inventive step 
(nonobviousness).58 The standard of inventiveness is intimately tied to 
a nation’s economic goals, and especially to its citizens’ technological 
 
 52. Id. art. 27(2). 
 53. Id. art. 30. 
 54. See id. art. 31; see also ABBOTT & REICHMAN, supra note 49, at 13 (noting that the 
proposed amendment to the TRIPS agreement, already accepted by WTO members on 
December 6, 2005, would permit expansion of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical 
products). 
 55. See, e.g., UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 135–214, 358–61 
(describing flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement); SISULE F. MUSUNGU, SUSAN VILLANUEVA 
& ROXANA BLASETTI, UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION 
THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS 23–34 (2004); Reichman, supra note 40, at 
28–29. 
 56. See Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Trade Framework: IP 
Trends in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 95, 97–98 (2004). 
 57. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4 (establishing MFN treatment). 
 58. Id. art. 27.1 (requiring patents to be made available for inventions that are “new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”). Footnote 5 equates the 
terms “inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” with “nonobvious” and “useful.” 
Id. n.5. 
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potential and to the types of creativity it can hope to foster.59 Even 
within one nation, determining the right standard can be difficult. In 
the United States, for example, the threshold of nonobviousness has 
varied widely at different periods,60 and it remains a contentious 
issue.61 
Perhaps for these reasons, TRIPS leaves the height of the 
inventive step to national law. Presumably, deep harmonization 
requires convergence on a single standard. Yet finding one that would 
suit countries at different levels of technological sophistication and 
for all kinds of intellectual advances could easily prove impossible.62 
Whatever standard is chosen will, at best, represent a mediate 
position—one that will differ from the optimum for many developing 
countries. 
More generally, there is a risk that virtually every procompetitive 
option still left open to developing countries under their domestic 
patent laws—from exceptions to patentability to limitations on 
exclusive rights and the possibility of imposing compulsory 
licenses63—would shrink or disappear in the SPLT. After all, if 
experience is any guide, on virtually all of these issues, the advanced 
industrialized countries will tend to demand higher protectionist 
standards than those favored by policymakers in developing 
countries. The United States, for example, has shown little willingness 
to limit the scope of patentable subject matter by adopting the 
“technical effect” requirement found in other countries’ patent 
statutes.64 The United States—indeed developed countries 
 
 59. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay 
Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 300–01 (1997); 
see CIPR, supra note 22, at 7. 
 60. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 35 (2004). 
 61. See id.; John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 508 (2003); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 887 (2004). Indeed, despite more than two-hundred years of 
experience with a patent system, the standard of nonobviousness was just the subject of another 
Supreme Court case, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). KSR’s effect 
on patent issuances remains to be seen, but it appears to have once again raised the standard of 
nonobviousness. 
 62. For example, although the standard in the United States is currently low, see, e.g., 
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 34–35, the standard in India is high, see Mueller, supra note 
38, at 86–89. 
 63. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 351–57. 
 64. Compare Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 9, arts. 52–53, 57 
(requiring patents to be capable of having an “industrial application,” defined by the EPO as 
requiring the ability to be used in any kind of industry), and European Patent Office, 
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generally—has resisted the inclusion of exceptions to patentability for 
health, the environment, or the protection of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.65 In fact, the United States appears to be 
taking the position that any agreement reached must reflect the 
standards of protection found in U.S. law.66 Such intransigence does 
not bode well for the kind of compromising required to produce an 
instrument that truly accommodates diverse needs. 
Of course, the TRIPS Agreement adopted some relatively high 
standards, and various bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
impose even higher ones.67 But in those negotiations, there is, at least 
theoretically, the prospect that advanced industrialized countries will 
exchange higher intellectual property standards for trade concessions 
in other areas which fosters some degree of equity. The rents to be 
extracted from a highly protectionist intellectual property regime 
would thus be offset (to some extent) by new market access 
opportunities. In the context of a free-standing patent agreement, 
such as the SPLT, no such compensation is possible. There is little in 
the way of offsetting doctrinal concessions that private stakeholders 
would permit developed-country negotiators to offer developing 
countries in return for adopting a patent regime that the latter regard 
as suboptimal. Such a bargaining stalemate, indeed, is precisely what 
caused the failure of the Diplomatic Conference to Revise the Paris 
Convention in 1985 and led the technology-exporting countries to 
 
Computer-Implemented Inventions, http://www.epo.org/focus/issues/computer-implemented-
inventions.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2007) (requiring patents for computer-implemented 
inventions to make a technical contribution), with State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. 
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (requiring only that mathematical inventions 
have a “useful, concrete and tangible result”(quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994))). 
 65. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
228–34 (2d ed. 2003); cf. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 & n.21 
(1980) (noting resistance to the adoption of compulsory licensing provisions in U.S. patent law). 
 66. See generally Hauda, supra note 17. 
 67. See, e.g., Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.4.7(e)(i), 
May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-
text/index.html (prohibiting parallel importation, even though the issue is left open by article 6 
of the TRIPS Agreement). See generally Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: 
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 80 (2004) 
(elaborating “on the bilateralism in [intellectual property rights] standard setting, using as an 
example the substantial elevation of [intellectual property rights] standards in the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement . . . in relation to pharmaceutical test data . . . and the new 
requirement . . . linking patent protection to the registration of a pharmaceutical product”). 
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bring intellectual property within the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations in 1986.68 
The counterargument is that the benefits of a smoothly working 
worldwide patent system will ultimately trickle down to developing 
countries and help them climb the technological innovation ladder.69 
Such a system would, in theory, lower transaction costs, produce 
greater legal certainty, and permit emerging economies to invest in 
building the technological skills of their population, secure in the 
knowledge that technology transfer and foreign direct investment will 
follow.70 
However, the counterargument has many defects. One is that no 
one knows the exact contours of a system that would produce these 
results, and a good case can be made for quite divergent approaches. 
For example, one of us has taken the Indian example to heart and 
argued that developing countries would benefit from a patent system 
that makes it easy to acquire protection.71 The theory is that such a 
regime would encourage innovation at the level at which it can be 
realistically elicited, and that the resulting patents would produce 
“buy in” in the form of an appreciation for the wealth that intellectual 
property protection creates.72 Conversely, the other author has 
suggested exactly the opposite: that the need to build competitive 
markets mandates that the acquisition of full patent rights should be 
 
 68. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986, 
MIN(86)/W/19, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/Punta_e.asp; see 
also SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 96–120 (2003) (“In effect, twelve corporations made public law for the 
world.”). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: 
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989) (addressing “industrialized countries’ growing concerns over 
technology transfer and their efforts to obtain protection of intellectual property rights under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”); Peter K. Yu, Symposium, Currents and 
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004) 
(demonstrating “that the international intellectual property regime is an ongoing project that 
provides opportunities and crises for both developed and less developed countries, as well as for 
rights holders and individual end users”). 
 69. See Maskus et al., supra note 35, at 265 (noting that developing countries rely on 
foreign technology to spark economic growth). 
 70. John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME, supra note 23, at 617, 622 (proposing ways to limit the costs of a global patent system 
for developing countries). 
 71. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 59, at 300. 
 72. Id. 
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made relatively difficult.73 On this view, governments should rely on 
second-tier regimes—such as utility model laws or “compensatory 
liability regimes” (liability rules)—to stimulate investment in locally 
attainable adaptations or improvements of foreign technology, and in 
“cumulative and sequential innovation” generally.74 In the absence of 
empirical evidence either way, experimentation makes more sense 
than freezing the law prematurely. 
Trumping all of these substantive and strategic considerations, 
moreover, is the fact that what developing countries most need is a 
period of calm and stability in which to devise intellectual property 
strategies consistent with both the TRIPS Agreement and the needs 
of their own emerging national and regional systems of innovation. 
This is a lengthy and arduous task in its own right. It is difficult for 
governments and civil society to interact in devising innovation 
policies that will maximize the use of local assets, minimize the social 
costs of high international minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection, and preserve an optimal supply of public goods that are as 
essential to long-term development prospects as legal incentives to 
innovate.75 Developing countries cannot succeed if, at the 
international level, a new round of multilateral intellectual property 
negotiations threatens to raise the technological ladder once again, 
before these countries even get a solid foothold on it.76 
II.  THE LIKELY ADVERSE IMPACT ON DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
However cogent the concerns of developing countries might be, 
one must nonetheless weigh them against the supposed benefits of 
deep harmonization.77 If lower transaction costs, increased legal 
certainty, and greater economies of scale and scope prove as 
remunerative as the advocates of harmonization contend, one could 
 
 73. Reichman, supra note 40, at 31. 
 74. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 3, 39–41; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy 
Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application 
to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 
337, 340–42 (arguing that a liability rule which promotes small-scale innovation in the 
developing world would stimulate investment by local entrepreneurs). 
 75. Margaret Chon, for example, highlights the problem of providing school children with 
affordable textbooks. Chon, supra note 25, at 2894–95. 
 76. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 37–39. 
 77. See Baechtold, supra note 18, at 142–43. See generally Hauda, supra note 17; Jeh, supra 
note 15. 
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envision a compromise scheme that achieves these ends on behalf of 
developed economies, but permits developing countries to reject such 
changes if, on balance, they are not as helpful to them as pursuing a 
slower track. Developing countries could be further placated with 
selected concessions78 and compensatory side payments.79 
The sad truth, however, is that no one has managed to put 
forward a vision of a properly functioning patent system for the 
developed world that commands even the appearance of a consensus. 
There are as many different proposals on the table as there are 
thinkers and investigators. With its relatively experienced patent 
office, excellent trial courts, specialized appellate court, and a 
Supreme Court poised to add a generalist perspective, the United 
States uniquely possesses the kind of institutional infrastructure 
needed to build and maintain a strong patent law system.80 Even so, 
all that the proponents for change in that country can agree on is that 
the patent law badly needs reform. The risk and cost of litigation is 
rising rapidly, which creates a drag on innovation and imposes 
disincentives to invest in creative production.81 Two studies by the 
National Academies82 and another by the Federal Trade 
 
 78. Concessions might include greater harmonization of international patent law with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, with imposition of certificates of origin and prior consent 
for inventions making use of developing country resources and with some recognition of 
traditional knowledge in international intellectual property law. See Thomas Cottier & Marion 
Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property 
Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 371, 372, 376 (2004); Graham Dutfield, Legal and Economic 
Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 
495, 505–06. 
 79. Robert O. Keohane, Comment: Norms, Institutions, and Cooperation, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 65, 67. 
 80. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
 81. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and 
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Sept. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript at 14, on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (suggesting that the costs of litigation are beginning to overtake the 
monetary rewards of the patent system, at least in certain technological sectors); Michael J. 
Meurer & James Bessen, The Patent Litigation Explosion 1 (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n 15th Annual 
Meeting, Working Paper No. 57, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art57; Scott 
Stern & Fiona Murray, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific 
Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 9–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=755701. 
 82. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC 
RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006) 
(considering the effects of patenting and licensing practices in the fields of genomics and 
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Commission,83 and criticism from numerous legal and economics 
scholars84 and a variety of judges85 have offered various diagnoses of 
the problems and assorted, often contradictory, prescriptions for 
change. Indeed, even the goals of the patent system are the subject of 
debate: although patents may still protect inventors from free riders, 
scholars have suggested that in many new industries, patents serve 
signaling, financing, and allocating functions,86 which arguably could 
be performed in ways that have fewer adverse effects on the public 
interest.87 
 
protemics and steps that the NIH can take to promote productivity and innovation); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) (offering seven 
criteria for evaluating the present patent system and seven recommendations for designing a 
more effective patent system). 
 83. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 
10/innovationrpt.pdf (recommending policies for maintaining the proper balance between 
patent law and competition law and policy). 
 84. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 35 (contending that patents are now 
available “to pretty much anyone who ask[s] for one, despite the legal tests or novelty and non-
obviousness,” arguing that the trend “now undermines rather than fosters the crucial process of 
innovation”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1559, 1578 (2006) (“[A] strong argument can be made that the observed problems are 
not caused merely by the implementation of the law, but also by its articulation: by an 
institutional failure to keep patent law and policy abreast with developments at the 
technological frontier.”); Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 24 nn.85–88 (citing critical 
articles by Professors Rai, Kesan, Merges, Lemley, Heller & Eisenberg, Barton and others); 
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 615 (1999) 
(proposing “common-sense starting points to deal with the problem of business concept 
patents”). In reality, Professors Jaffe and Lerner are more optimistic than they sound, because 
they think the problems stem from how the patent law is applied and not from what it provides. 
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 5–6. 
 85. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the majority’s position on utility standards); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle 
& Co., 358 F.3d 916, 919–30 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (considering and rejecting Rochester’s position on 
the written description requirement); Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 
863–64 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with the dissent’s position on the scope of infringement 
liability), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 86. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemary Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox: An 
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 
101, 102 (2001) (examining the “‘patent paradox’ in the semiconductor industry, where the gap 
between the relative ineffectiveness of patents . . . and their widespread use is particularly 
striking”); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (“The ability to 
convey information credibly to observers at low cost is a highly valuable role of patents that has 
been completely overlooked.”); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software 
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005) (analyzing the role patents play in fostering investments). 
 87. For example, Dirk Czarnitzki and his coauthors demonstrate a positive correlation 
between patenting rate and publication rate, which suggests that publications could serve as 
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In Europe, similar uncertainty exists. In a publication entitled 
Scenarios for the Future,88 the European Patent Office (EPO)89 has 
frankly recognized the uncertain future of the worldwide patent 
system. It has outlined four different scenarios that could emerge in 
response to different interest groups seeking to influence domestic 
and international policymaking forums. 
The first scenario envisions the tightening of worldwide patent 
standards under an international treaty, such as the SPLT, a position 
championed by many multinational corporations.90 A second scenario 
envisions the evolution of a variegated system in which developing 
countries—especially emerging economies—gradually reshape the 
existing patent system to suit their own comparative advantages.91 A 
third scenario envisions a shift toward second-tier regimes, possibly 
sounding in liability rules rather than exclusive rights, which would 
specifically address the problems posed by cumulative and sequential 
innovation.92 The fourth scenario envisions a re-elaboration of the 
 
signals of technological competence. Dirk Czarnitzki, Wolfgang Glänzel & Katrin Hussinger, 
An Empirical Assessment of Co-Activity Among German Professors 17 (ZEW Ctr. for 
European Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 06-080, 2006), available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/ 
pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06080.pdf. Eric Brousseau and coauthors have investigated the use of 
contracts to govern relationships among innovators in the high-tech sector. Eric Brousseau, 
Régis Coeurderoy & Camille Chaserant, The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on 
Technology Licensing Agreements, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 205, 205 
(2007). Paul David’s work looks at the role of publication rates in allocating research resources 
in science. Paul A. David, Positive Feedbacks and Research Productivity in Science: Reopening 
Another Black Box, in ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGY 65, 69–70 (O. Granstrand ed., 1994). 
 88. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (EPO), SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE—HOW MIGHT IP 
REGIMES EVOLVE BY 2025? WHAT GLOBAL LEGITIMACY MIGHT SUCH REGIMES HAVE? 
(2007) [hereinafter SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE]. 
 89. The EPO is not an organ of the European Communities. Rather, it was established by 
the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC). Id. at inside cover. The EPO, which 
acts as a regional patent office for the member states, is the executive body of the treaty 
members. There is also an administrative council, which operates as a de facto legislative body. 
Revisions of the EPC are undertaken by an intergovernmental diplomatic conference for the 
contracting states. Id. 
 90. See id. at 30–47. With “[b]usiness as the dominant driver,” this scenario tells “[t]he story 
of consolidation in the face of a system that has been so successful that it is collapsing under its 
own weight; Power and Global Jungle are the major driving forces.” Id. at 29. 
 91. See id. at 48–65. With “[g]eopolitics as dominant driver,” this scenario tells “the story of 
conflict in the face of changing geopolitical balances and competing ambitions, where Power 
and Global Jungle are the major driving forces, but in contrast to the business-led scenario, the 
states are the key players.” Id. at 29. 
 92. See id. at 95–96. With “[t]echnology as dominant driver,” this scenario tells “[t]he story 
of differentiation in the face of global systemic crises, where Pace of Change, Systemic Risks 
and Knowledge Paradox (as the nature of knowledge changes) are the major driving forces.” Id. 
at 29; see also J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
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basic patent paradigm that would give much greater weight to the 
provision of public goods and “access to knowledge” in general, at the 
expense of private incentives to innovate.93 Although the EPO takes 
no position on which of these scenarios it favors, its publication 
demonstrates that policymakers responsible for the future evolution 
of the patent system will be constrained to take account of the 
divergent interests underlying each of these remarkably prescient 
scenarios. 
It should, indeed, surprise no one that routine tinkering with a 
patent paradigm launched in Venice in the fifteenth century and 
refined by the United Kingdom in the seventeenth century cannot 
answer the hard questions raised by new technologies and the new 
modes of producing them.94 There are major challenges for which past 
experiences give only untested and untrustworthy hypotheses, with 
no convincing empirical studies on the horizon to resolve the doubts. 
These problems affect all aspects of patent protection. Not only are 
there discordant views on how high the inventive step should be, 
there are also disagreements on virtually every substantive topic 
under discussion in connection with the SPLT: novelty and utility 
standards, the research exemption, compulsory licenses—along with 
standards for analyzing infringement and awarding relief.95 
 
Subpatentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 23, 24 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 
2001) [hereinafter Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu] (proposing a “compensatory 
liability regime” for incremental innovation); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent 
and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2447 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal 
Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms] (suggesting that a liability regime would 
increase investment in cumulative and sequential technologies while avoiding market failure 
with fewer anticompetitive effects). 
 93. See SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 88, at 72. With “[s]ociety as the dominant 
driver,” this scenario tells, “[t]he story of erosion [of patent law] in the face of diminishing 
societal trust, where Power (from the bottom up) and societal fear of Pace of Change and 
Systemic Risks—and Knowledge Paradox (in terms of access and control)—are the major 
driving forces.” Id. at 29; see also Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Movement, 117 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (describing the development of groups opposing restrictive rights 
and promoting greater public access). 
 94. See MAY & SELL, supra note 27, at 203–18 (“Only by understanding the long history of 
intellectual property can the problems of its contemporary global governance be properly 
assessed.”). See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002) (discussing the diversity of patent law and the potential costs 
of harmonization). 
 95. See, e.g., Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the 
Substantive Requirements of Patent Law, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,409, 15,409–11 (Mar. 19, 2001) (listing 
seventeen differences between U.S. patent law and the law of other developed countries); see 
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Furthermore, there are a multitude of open procedural 
questions—including questions about the level of scrutiny that patent 
offices give to applications,96 the standards for reexamining issued 
patents, as well as the availability of avenues to challenge patents 
administratively (through opposition procedures)97 and judicially 
(through, for instance, declaratory judgment actions).98 The National 
Academies’ Report criticized the reluctance of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit to defer to the examination guidelines that the 
U.S. Patent Office applies to new technologies, while applying 
unrealistic standards of its own that ignore what those skilled in the 
art actually know.99 Others have questioned vesting powers over 
patent law in a single specialized court, pointing to the Federal 
Circuit’s penchant for de novo review,100 its apparent lack of interest 
in economics or patent policy,101 and its insulation from criticism.102 
 
also James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44, 44 (describing the 
proliferation of patent infringement claims in e-commerce). 
 96. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1495–96 (2001). 
 97. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 181, 192 (discussing opposition procedures and 
standards of proof). 
 98. For U.S. examples, see the various proposals for patent reform, including the Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); the Patent Reform Act of 2005, 
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), which proposed opposition procedures, including varying 
standards of proof on the question of validity; and the ruling in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 775–76 (2007), in favor of standing to challenge patent validity in a 
declaratory judgment action. Cf. Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 515, 516 (2003) (advocating instant disclosure of all patent applications via 
the Internet). 
 99. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 82, at 87–95. 
 100. See, e.g., Samantha A. Jameson, Note, The Problems of the Utility Analysis in Fisher 
and its Associated Policy Implications and Flaws, 56 DUKE L.J. 311, 311 (2006) (questioning 
whether the PTO is equipped to deal with policy and criticizing the decision in Fisher). 
 101. Cf. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e observe that the 
government and its amici express concern that allowing EST patents without proof of utility 
would discourage research, delay scientific discovery, and thwart progress in the ‘useful Arts’ 
and ‘Science.’ . . . [These] are public policy considerations which are more appropriately 
directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government, rather than this court as a judicial 
body responsible simply for interpreting and applying statutory law.”). See generally Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 769 (2004) (surveying the effects of “specializing the adjudication of patent disputes by 
channeling patent appeals to a single court”). 
 102. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 84, at 1567–70; Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-
Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 913 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1035, 1035 (2003); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
02__REICHMAN_DREYFUSS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:15:45 PM 
108 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:85 
This Article cannot explore all of the problems with which the 
system is grappling. Our purpose is to demonstrate how promulgating 
substantive law in the absence of either a normative consensus or an 
authority competent (in both the cognitive and juridic sense) to 
administer and revise it will interfere with the emergence of new 
industries, with scientific advancement, and with the development of 
new approaches to encouraging and supporting innovation. 
A. Emerging Industries 
Although there is broad dissatisfaction with domestic patent 
systems, many of the complaints—at least in the United States—are 
based on law developed for emerging sectors, principally information 
technology and biotechnology.103 These issues merit a deeper look. 
1. Information Technology (IT).  With regard to the IT sector, 
there is considerable debate about the need for exclusive rights to 
promote development of software and business methods and whether 
patent protection is the appropriate regime to use. Unlike copyrights 
and contractual rights, patents create claims that are good even 
against independent inventors. For cumulative technologies or in 
instances where interoperability is an important goal, the need to sift 
through prior patents and negotiate rights arguably creates a high tax 
on innovation and a drag on development.104 
Other untoward consequences may flow from the decision to 
permit patenting in this area. For example, the risk of debilitating 
suits motivates participants to acquire multiple patents, hoping that 
with enough potential counterclaims, they can fend off or negotiate 
their way out of difficulty. The result is a vicious cycle: thickets of 
rights that are expensive (or nearly impossible) to clear, requiring an 
ever-larger arsenal of defensive protection.105 Furthermore, many IT 
products involve multiple inventions and, accordingly, multiple 
 
Principle 5 (George Washington Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 225), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928498. 
 103. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155–56 (2002). 
 104. See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A 
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 
2422 (1994). Many of these problems were identified well before patents on software were 
issued. Id. at 2361. 
 105. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 59. 
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licenses.106 In that environment, holdout possibilities are numerous 
and, as the Blackberry case107 nearly demonstrated, can potentially 
undermine the investments of producers, other patentees, and the 
public.108 All of this patenting activity fosters so many potential 
lawsuits that, as economists James Bessen and Michael Meurer have 
concluded, the cost of litigation has begun to exceed the profits from 
patents by all measures in this sector.109 
In addition, some IT products are characterized by strong 
network effects and standard setting, which may make switching costs 
high and lock consumers into inferior products.110 Those holding 
patent rights in products toward which a market has tipped receive 
awards out of proportion to the technical contributions of the 
inventors. When these patents also dominate their fields, they allow 
right holders to prevent entry by competitors.111 
Commentators further criticize the way the law has been 
administered. To some, the European approach, which looks for a 
technical effect, is superior because it greatly limits the kinds of 
information technology that can be protected.112 Others note that, 
because courts assume the level of skill in the art to be high, they 
relieve patentees of the obligation to disclose the underlying code. 
 
 106. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 86, at 109–10 (discussing semiconductors). 
 107. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 108. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. 
L. BULL. 1, 5 (2005). 
 109. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 81 (manuscript at 13, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(noting that “annual worldwide profits from software patents are only $0.69 billion, far less than 
litigation costs”). 
 110. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive 
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 124 (2006). 
 111. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works/Unique Challenges at the Intellectual 
Property/Competition Law Interface, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 119, 121–23 
(2005) (noting that the dominance factor exists especially in fields such as biotechnology); Carl 
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 1 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 119 (2001) (“In several key industries, including 
semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, and the Internet, our patent system is 
creating a patent thicket: an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to 
commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.”). 
 112. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 278–79 (2000) (advocating an approach that asks 
whether “a patent incentive is actually required to promote investment in innovation”); John R. 
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1179–84 (1999) (stating 
that “the European Patent Convention presents the most fulsome articulation of the industrial 
applicability standard”). 
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These patents can be very broad and, because they fail to enable, they 
deprive the public of disclosure, which is one of the significant 
benefits of the patent system.113 Moreover, because monetary 
damages are calculated based on the value of the product and not of 
the patent that has been infringed, this sector attracts “trolls,” who 
are in the business of making money though litigation rather than 
through product development.114 
2. Biotechnology.  The burgeoning field of biotechnology is 
experiencing a different set of problems. Here, courts and the PTO 
consider the level of skill quite low,115 which leads to narrow patents 
and the danger of an “anticommons effect.”116 When that occurs, 
property rights cannot be aggregated efficiently to create, for 
example, effective methods for assembling and screening new 
molecules or to realize the ambitions of personalized medicine, which 
would require whole-genome sequencing. 
Because U.S. courts tend to conceptualize DNA as molecules 
rather than information products,117 manufacturers and researchers 
can easily evade patent rights in some cases by—essentially—
paraphrasing the information covered by the patent.118 As a result, the 
patent may yield insufficient incentives to support research in a given 
area.119 Paradoxically, there is also a growing number of patents in this 
 
 113. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring a “written description of the . . . manner and 
process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same” (emphasis added)); Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1689 (2003). 
 114. See Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New 
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 307 (2006); cf. Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong., § 5(a)(2) (2007) (proposing a change in damages 
calculation based upon “the patent’s specific contribution”). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (refusing to find the subject of 
a patent “obvious” despite the fact the “the claimed molecules, their functions, and their general 
chemical nature may have been obvious from” prior research); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he combination of prior art references does not render the claimed 
invention obvious . . . .”). 
 116. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998). 
 117. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999). 
 118. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of 
Structural Biology, Genomics, & Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 876 (2006) (noting 
that manufacturers could alter “protected nucleotide sequences” while generating a functionally 
similar product). 
 119. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 113, at 1676–80. 
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field—particularly patents on genes and certain proteins that are, at 
least for research purposes, so broad120 that it is unlikely a patent 
holder could efficiently exploit the entire breadth of the claims. 
Meanwhile, the potential blocking effects appear increasingly serious. 
3. Reconciling the Needs of Different Sectors.  It is not clear that 
these problems will be easy to resolve. First, these quick sketches of 
two emerging sectors demonstrate that there is disagreement 
concerning the existence, scope, and nature of the problem. For 
example, despite the strong and persistent complaints about patents 
in the software industry, there is some empirical evidence that the 
patent system is not hurting—and may be helping—the development 
of this sector.121 Patent reform is thus stalling at least in part because 
domestic stakeholders cannot even agree that reform will be worth 
the dislocations it will entail. 
Second, there are disputes about how to handle the problems. 
For example, some economists claim that reengineering the law is not 
necessary. They argue that the system could be restored to order by 
simply improving the quality of the patents that issue (that is, by 
creating a mechanism for ensuring that patents issue only for 
inventions that are truly nonobvious).122 
Third, it is proving so difficult to find common ground among the 
various patent industries that some have suggested sector-specific 
legislation.123 If heeded, this approach could take patent law down 
untested pathways culminating in a set of clumsy, sui generis 
regimes.124 Moreover, even if such an approach proved politically 
 
 120. See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human 
Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005) (suggesting that sometimes a single gene can be 
associated with as many as twenty patents); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents 
and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 711–12 & n.19 (2004); see also Andrew Chin, Artful 
Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV. 975, 977 (2006) (describing the 
shortcomings of the U.S. Patent Office registry approach in documenting prior art of genetic 
research, thus leading to “low-quality patents . . . issued on inventions that are already known or 
represent only an obvious advance in the field”). 
 121. Mann, supra note 86, at 985–1012; Robert P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the 
Software Industry (Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=926204). 
 122. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 60, at 197–207. 
 123. Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1202 (suggesting that industry-specific tailoring is 
“desirable”). 
 124. Cf. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, supra note 
92, at 2445 (examining “proliferating legal hybrids . . . [that] represent both a consequence of . . . 
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feasible in a domestic setting, it could elicit objections sounding in the 
TRIPS Agreement, which requires that “patents . . . be available and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of 
technology.”125 But TRIPS is only a minimum standard regime. Were 
the United States bound by an instrument that required complete 
substantive harmonization, resolving the issues that exist within 
emerging industries would not be feasible without endless rounds of 
entangling negotiations—and, if the system includes enforceable 
obligations, unsettling appeals.126 
Moreover, the technology sectors are hardly the end of the line: 
science is sure to generate new and equally daunting innovation 
opportunities in the future. Synthetic biology represents one such 
development.127 Because it utilizes both software and biotechnological 
advances, this field potentially suffers from the combined impact of 
 
growing incoherence and a cause of the incipient breakdown that is weakening the international 
intellectual property system from within”). 
 125. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27(1); see also Panel Report, Canada-Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (distinguishing between 
permissible reconcilable “differentiation” attributable to needs of different product sectors and 
impermissible “discrimination”). But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 450 (2007) (arguing that “[d]iscrimination is not the 
same as differential treatment” and suggesting that some types of differentiating should 
withstand challenge). 
 126. The TRIPS dispute resolution experience is not an entirely happy one in this respect 
because WTO Settlement Panels have been ill equipped to deal with technical legal issues. See, 
e.g., Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 413 (identifying “interpretive approaches” to the 
TRIPS Agreement and raising “questions regarding the level of formalism” of the WTO dispute 
settlement process); Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement: Of Sovereign Interests, Private 
Rights and Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 
817, 829 (examining “the tension between sovereign/government interests, private rights, and 
public goods” in the WTO dispute settlement process); Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public 
Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and 
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 
884, 884 (focusing on disputes related to pharmaceutical patents and concerns about public 
goods including “the generation of new knowledge, the provision of public health, and the 
maintenance of rules fostering trade and competition”). 
 127. Synthetic biology is an engineering field that utilizes artificially constructed DNA to 
construct/program useful “machines” (such as plants that produce fuel). See generally Philip 
Ball, Starting from Scratch, 431 NATURE 624 (2004) (describing synthetic biology and concerns 
about risks associated with the field). 
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patenting problems in both sectors.128 Were the SPLT to be 
implemented, its adherents would have diminished capacity to adapt 
the legal order so that such new opportunities could flourish. 
B. Scientific Advancement 
The prospects for the future could become even more troubling. 
As patenting moves upstream to cover fundamental advances, 
existing dysfunctionalities within the system could impede scientific 
progress and reduce the chances of generating future opportunities 
for innovation. Drawing once again on the situation in the United 
States as an example, a reorganization underway within the scientific 
community has begun to pose hard and unresolved problems for 
patent law. 
A major development was, undoubtedly, the wholesale entry of 
universities into the patent system. Since the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act in 1980,129 which permits universities to patent the fruits of 
federally funded research, filings by the university sector have 
significantly increased.130 Although the statute aimed mainly to 
encourage technology transfer, universities increasingly understand it 
as a funding mechanism, with many untoward consequences for 
science and education. Most obviously, work that once would have 
gone into the public domain for general and free use becomes 
privatized.131 
 
 128. See Arti K. Rai & Sapna Kumar, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2007) (“The manner in which the law has handled software on the one 
hand and biotechnology on the other may not bode well for synthetic biology.”). 
 129. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000)). 
 130. The issue of cause and effect is itself a subject of dispute. Some claim that the Bayh-
Dole Act created the university patenting phenomenon, whereas others contend that 
universities’ desire to patent gave rise to the Act. See Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting 
and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 
30 RES. POL’Y 99, 100 (2001). 
 131. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1998) 
(“Only in exceptional circumstances does the statute acknowledge that there may be an 
affirmative case for putting a discovery in the public domain for the greater good.”); Rai & 
Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 303 (discussing how increased patent opportunities may reduce the 
chance that technology will end up in the public domain); see also J.H. Reichman & Paul F. 
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly 
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 342–43 
(Winter/Spring 2003) (discussing the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on university research and 
the public domain). 
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Moreover, because academia engages in fundamental research, 
university patenting tends to push upstream, which creates broad 
rights over core methodologies and research tools—rights that can 
dominate diverse research agendas.132 Although there is some 
empirical evidence indicating that universities have begun to patent 
more selectively and license these opportunities more wisely,133 horror 
stories abound in which universities reportedly signed over rights 
without any guarantee that their licensees would bring products to 
market. Indeed, sometimes universities appear to have licensed rights 
to institutions that had private reasons to stifle research and access.134 
Perhaps to counter this problem, the courts have begun to deploy 
various patent law theories to narrow the ambit of broad claims.135 
But overly narrow rights in “slivers of innovation” create problems of 
their own.136 
Even if the universities’ behavior were to improve, problems 
with their patenting practices could persist. Courts have decided that 
because universities are behaving as commercial actors, patent law 
should treat them as such. Accordingly, courts do not afford academic 
researchers special privileges to delay work on patentable subject 
matter, even when the delay arises from attempts to preserve 
 
 132. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research 
Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, supra note 
92, at 223, 225 (“[T]here seems to be a widely-shared perception that negotiations over the 
transfer of proprietary research tools present a considerable and growing obstacle to progress in 
biomedical research and product development.”). See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching 
Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT at 
209 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing reach-through strategies, remedies, and mechanisms). 
 133. See David C. Mowery, Bhaven N. Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Learning to Patent: 
Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents after the 
Bayh-Dole Act, 1981–1992, 48 MGMT. SCI. 73, 85–86 (2002). 
 134. See Avital Bar-Shalom & Robert Cook-Deegan, Patents and Innovation in Cancer 
Therapeutics: Lessons from CellPro, 80 MILBANK Q. 637, 661 (2002); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, 
The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1417–27 
(2007). 
 135. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(finding that the University’s patent was invalid for lack of an adequate description and stating 
that the Bayh-Dole Act “was not intended to relax the statutory requirements for patentability” 
for universities). 
 136. J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF 
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 132, at 289, 297; see also supra text accompanying 
note 116. 
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pedagogic opportunities for students.137 This creates one of a series of 
new conflicts between a university’s educational mission and its 
commercial goals; between a faculty member’s research and teaching 
commitments; and between the academy’s duties as honest brokers in 
science policy debates and its proprietary self-interest. 
Far more worrisome is the judicial trend to deny academics 
engaged in scholarly inquiry any further research exemptions from 
infringement liability.138 Fortunately, few infringement suits have been 
filed against universities to date, but if such cases were to proliferate 
unchecked, the cost of basic science would soar. Even in the absence 
of suits against scientists, an empirical study has uncovered evidence 
that university research is beginning to suffer from an anticommons 
effect.139 Although some studies also claim that patents have little 
direct impact on university work, scholarship has documented the 
erosion of the Mertonian norms, with increased secrecy and a 
growing reluctance to share research materials.140 Furthermore, 
patenting could easily come to affect scholarly agendas, shifting 
attention from the basic work that opens whole new fields of 
knowledge to applied research aimed narrowly at exploiting 
particular commercial markets. Again, the empirical evidence is 
mixed, but the effects of an increasing interest in patenting (and 
commerce) on the part of university faculty is alarming.141 
 
 137. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding no excuse for 
a university professor-inventor’s inactivity when he claimed that his delay was due in part to the 
fact that he was waiting for a particular graduate student to begin work). 
 138. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[O]ur precedent 
does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate 
business, regardless of commercial implications. For example, major research universities, such 
as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably no commercial application 
whatsoever. However, these projects unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate business 
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these 
projects. These projects also serve, for example, to increase the status of the institution and lure 
lucrative research grants, students and faculty.”). 
 139. Stern & Murray, supra note 81, at 5. 
 140. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene 
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006); Wesley M. Cohen & 
John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & 
ECON. (Adam B. Jaffe, Joshua Lerner & Scott Stern eds., forthcoming 2007); Wesley M. Cohen, 
John P. Walsh & Charlene Cho, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 
SCIENCE 2002, 2002 (2005). For an introduction to Mertonian norms, see ROBERT K. MERTON, 
The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
 141. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby Stuart, The Determinants of Faculty 
Patenting Behavior: Demographics or Opportunities?, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 599, 601 
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In theory, of course, legislation might remedy some of these 
problems. For example, Congress could enact a codified research 
exemption.142 Patent applications from academics could be examined 
differently, and the scope of patents could be adjusted to deal with 
the anticommons effect. When necessary, compulsory licenses to 
unblock dependent patents and enable improvers to reach the market 
could also be enacted, a solution that remains fully consistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement.143 
Yet, as Section A showed, there is substantial disagreement 
concerning the very existence of the problems and the wisdom of 
proposed legislative solutions.144 Were the laws in question subject to 
substantive international obligations, it would compound these 
problems. Some economies may rely on the spillover benefits of basic 
research; others may see commercializing university work as an 
important source of funding. Another complicating factor is that 
universities do not participate equally in all commercial sectors. 
Consequently, arguments about technological neutrality would arise 
 
(2007) (suggesting that mid-career faculty, faculty associated with patent holders, and faculty 
employed by institutions holding many patents are more likely to patent); Mario Calderini, 
Chiara Fanzoni & Andrea Vezzulli, If Star Scientists Do Not Patent: The Effect of Productivity, 
Basicness and Impact on the Decision to Patent in the Academic World, 36 RES. POL’Y 303, 317 
(2007) (suggesting that scientists engaged in applied research are more likely to patent than 
scientists engaged in basic research); Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post Bayh-Dole 
Rise of Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 15 (2001) (arguing that the 
rising number of patents suggests trouble down the road); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. 
Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT. 
SCI. 90, 102 (2002) (showing that research agendas are not changing significantly, but instead 
universities are patenting discoveries that they would previously have made publicly available). 
 142. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the 
Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 463 (2004) (calling for a 
broad, statutory experimental use exception). 
 143. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 31(l); JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH 
CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA 1–2 (June 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ 
ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf. 
 144. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic 
Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 132, 
at 153, 168, 168 (suggesting the current system of genomic patent filings is preferable to 
alternatives), with Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: 
A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF 
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 132, at 196, 195–96 (examining the assumptions 
underlying arguments for and against legislative stability); see also Reichman, supra note 136, at 
289 (contesting Epstein’s “all or nothing” premise and proposing greater reliance on liability 
rules). 
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in any attempt to alter the patent system to protect core scientific 
progress. 
C. New Approaches 
When faced with the problems of new technologies and new 
players, countries have adopted very different strategies. In 
particular, the U.S. approach differs significantly from developments 
in Europe. With regard to patents in biotechnology, for example, the 
EPO, following the European Directive on Biotechnology,145 seems to 
be breaking away from the “chemical compound” analogy that 
typifies U.S. law. Instead, it has begun to treat DNA patents as 
information products, whose eligibility tests should turn on the 
quality and industrial applicability of the information revealed.146 
The EC Biotechnology Directive also added a new compulsory 
license to facilitate interaction between infringing plant breeders and 
biotech patents.147 When implementing the Biotechnology Directive, 
moreover, a number of European governments have embarked on 
new directions of their own at the expense of a uniform law. 
Although some nations were initially unwilling to fully implement the 
Biotechnology Directive,148 others, such as Germany, have attempted 
to limit gene patents to the use or purpose recited in the application.149 
The EPO also seems to have handled the information technology 
sector more cautiously than the United States by insisting on a 
demonstrable “technical contribution” palpably beyond the state of 
 
 145. Council Directive 98/44, Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 
213) 13 (EC). 
 146. See Rob J. Aerts, The Industrial Applicability and Utility Requirements for the Patenting 
of Genomic Inventions: A Comparison between European and US Law, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 349, 351–52 (2004); Samantha A. Jameson, A Comparison of the Patentability and Patent 
Scope of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States and the European Union, 35 AIPLA 
Q.J. 193, 217–24 (2007). 
 147. See Council Directive 98/44, supra note 145, art. 12. 
 148. The recalcitrant EU Member States all implemented the Directive by the end of 2006. 
See STATE OF PLAY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC (2007), http://www. 
europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/indprop/docs/invent/state-of-play_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 
4, 2007). 
 149. German Patent Statute, PatG § 1a(4). The provision is controversial. See, e.g., 
Christoph Ann, Patents on Human Gene Sequences in Germany: On Bad Lawmaking and Ways 
to Deal With It, 7 GERMAN L. J. 279, 280, available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ 
pdf/Vol07/pdf_Vol_07_No_03.pdf. 
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the art.150 How the EPO proceeds in this area following the European 
Parliament’s rejection of a proposed Community Directive on the 
Patenting of Software deserves careful scrutiny.151 Furthermore, even 
if patents on software were eventually to produce the kind of 
blocking effects experienced in the United States, many European 
countries formally recognize the possibility of compulsory licenses for 
dependent patents on improvements.152 Although these provisions are 
seldom invoked, they likely exert in terrorem effects that stimulate 
efficient licensing practices, and they provide patent authorities with a 
codified antiblocking measure when needed. 
Moreover, the patent system is not the only mechanism for 
encouraging technological progress. A strong argument can be made 
for supplementing patents with new kinds of intermediate or second-
tier protection systems that are more attuned to present-day 
technological realities. Although robust property-like regimes, such 
as patent law, presuppose clear boundaries between different rights 
holders, the actual boundaries between products of the new 
technologies are often ill-defined. The problem of cumulative 
innovation is thus aggravated by the ways in which new contributions 
are dependent on, and intermingled with, earlier innovations. Patents 
increasingly breed high litigation and transaction costs because they 
artificially divide that which is inherently indivisible, a practice that 
needlessly slows the rate of innovation by chilling the ability of 
second comers to build on earlier contributions for both scientific and 
commercial purposes.153 
 
 150. Thomas Hoeren, The European Union Commission and Recent Trends in European 
Information Law, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2003); E. Panagiotidou, The 
Patentability of Computer Programs, according to the Commission’s New Proposal for a 
Directive and to EPO Boards of Appeal Decisions, 9 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 126, 
129 (2003); Wolfgang Tauchert, Patent Protection for Computer Programs—Current Status and 
New Developments, 31 IIC 812, 818 (2000). 
 151. See, e.g., Andreas Grosche, Software Patents—Boon or Bane for Europe?, 14 INT’L J.L. 
& INFO. TECH. 257, 259–60 (2006) (providing analysis of a wide scope of patent laws and 
policies beyond the proposed provisions before the European Parliament). 
 152. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48A(1)(b)(i) (Eng.); 2 J.W. Baxter, World Patent 
Law and Practice § 8.02 (2001); see also Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 104 (1994) 
(“[S]tatutes [that] provide, in varying ways, for a liability rule in the case of an improvement 
invention that infringes on a dominant patent . . . have no discernable effect on the incentives 
for European firms to invent.”); REICHMAN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 143, at 12 
(discussing the presence of blocking patents on improvements to prior inventions in many 
countries). 
 153. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu, supra note 92, at 23, 26–29. 
02__REICHMAN_DREYFUSS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:15:45 PM 
2007] PATENT LAW HARMONIZATION 119 
In sectors where these conditions prevail, a different kind of 
regime may be superior. To give one example, compensatory liability 
regimes—liability rules—may be a good solution for cumulative 
technologies. They would protect first comers against wholesale 
duplication while enabling improvers to build on their work, subject 
to an obligation to return a healthy share of the potential gains to the 
earlier innovator.154 These entitlements could be voluntarily adopted 
by industrial sectors or mandated by law or regulation to resolve 
blocking effects.155 Other ideas—open source models, collaborative 
modes of production, clearinghouse models—have also attracted 
growing attention,156 although their dependence on exclusive property 
rights is often overlooked.157 
Of course, not all the advocates of deep harmonization claim to 
know all the answers; rather, some suggest codifying basic aspects of 
domestic patent law—so-called “best practices”—that would provide 
a solid foundation for transnational harmonization.158 But this 
approach is premised on several fallacies. First, even for countries at 
similar levels of technological sophistication, “best practices” are not 
likely to be the same. Moreover, what any given country views as 
“best practices” in patent law may reflect other practices in other 
laws—including copyright, trade secret, utility model laws, and, above 
all, competition laws—that may vary widely from one country to 
another.159 The advocates of a “best practices” approach to 
 
 154. See, e.g., id., at 48–52; Reichman & Lewis, supra note 74, at 337, 348–65. 
 155. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 
supra note 92 (showing breakdown of trade secret law under present-day conditions and 
advocating use of liability rules not premised on secrecy to deal with market failures affecting 
incremental innovation). 
 156. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 463–66, 471–73 (2006); Ian Ayres & J.M. 
Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE 
L.J. 703, 706–07 (1996); Janet Hope, Open Source Biotechnology (Dec. 23, 2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, The Australian National University), available at http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~janeth/ 
OpenSourceBiotechnology27July2005.pdf; Geertui Van Overwalle et al., Models for Facilitating 
Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions, 7 NATURE REVIEWS: GENETICS 143 (2006)Esther van 
Zimmeren et al., A Clearing House for Diagnostic Testing: The Solution to Ensure Access to and 
Use of Patented Genetic Inventions?, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 352, 353–56 (2006). 
 157. See Boyle, supra note 28, at 67–69. 
 158. See Hauda, supra note 17, at 97. 
 159. See Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 177–99 
(1999) (critiquing the harmonization of second tier patent regimes); Jonathan Zuck, President, 
Ass’n for Competitive Tech., Comments to the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n (Feb. 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.amc.gov/public_studies_fr28902/international_pdf/060207_ACT_Intl.pdf 
(noting the importance of consistent treatment of small businesses in the information 
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harmonization do not explain how to identify which practices are 
genuinely the best, or explain how international lawmakers will keep 
the practices they choose responsive to changing needs. 
Another more subtle effect of premature legal harmonization is 
that it could unhelpfully homogenize creative development. The 
diverging approaches observed in national innovation laws may not 
solely depend on differing perceptions of how to cure the same set of 
problems. Some of these differences may emerge from differing 
problems, differences that arise because each society values its own 
specific kinds of creativity and prioritizes its technological 
requirements in its own way. The TRIPS Agreement still leaves 
countries some room to exclude developments from patentability on 
grounds such as public policy and lack of inventiveness, or because 
the work is not considered within a field of “technology” and 
therefore not within the subject matter of patent law.160 As a result, a 
country that excels in certain kinds of work has some flexibility to put 
the tools for accomplishing that work into the public domain; other 
countries skilled in producing the tools may prefer to make them 
patentable.161 
 
technology sector). The debate outlined in the text accompanying this footnote suggests that, at 
a minimum, the level of intellectual property protection in any given country may depend on 
whether that country has enacted and implemented antitrust law to deal with competitive 
excesses. Yet, the SPLT (like TRIPS) does not mandate protection outside the intellectual 
property field, and antitrust law is only one of the many related issues that might influence the 
appropriate level of protection. See Josef Drexl, The Critical Role of Competition Law in 
Preserving Public Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 709, 716–24; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect 
the Global Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 23, at 758, 758–69; Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 33–41; Hanns Ullrich, 
Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS 
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 23, at 726, 737, 752. 
 160. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27. 
 161. For example, the United States and Canada have taken divergent positions on whether 
higher-order life forms can be patented, leading to different treatment of mice bred as research 
tools in the life sciences. Compare Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm’r of Patents), File 28155, 
2002 S.C.C. 76 (Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2002/2002scc76/ 
2002scc76.html (holding the oncomouse unpatentable), with Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, 
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988), available at, 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (search for “4,736,866” in “Field1: Patent 
Number”), and Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 445 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (holding certain living organisms 
patentable). 
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Because the information necessary to match particular 
approaches to specific types of innovation opportunities is lacking, 
allowing nations to experiment would be highly beneficial. Some will 
use legislative solutions; the Supreme Court’s foray into patent law 
suggests that the U.S. approach may be judicially based;162 and in 
some places, voluntary schemes will emerge. Over time, experts can 
compare and evaluate these experiments, and when one or another 
solution appears to yield positive results, nations can emulate that 
approach. Harmonization would, in that event, be achieved 
voluntarily and on the basis of actual empirical data and experience, 
not simply backroom wrangling and special-interest lobbying.163 
Allowing nations to shape their laws also gives rise to 
comparative advantages by enabling each nation to foster what its 
technological community does best. So long as trade remains 
relatively free, the flexibility to experiment enhances social welfare 
worldwide. Accommodations between national and regional systems 
of innovation can then evolve over time on the basis of bottom-up 
preferences. Without an agreed-upon legitimate governance process 
(through administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures), it is 
difficult to see how these kinds of continual accommodations can 
occur. A politically skewed re-regulation of the world market, 
 
 162. Between the summer of 2005 and the summer of 2007, the Supreme Court considered 
seven patent cases. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curiam) 
(dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 
S. Ct. 1837 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); Merck KGaA 
v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 163. To be sure, special-interest politics will play out in domestic arenas as well. But in the 
international context, the problems are particularly severe: well-heeled groups may be better at 
attracting international attention, and differences in the ways in which international and 
domestic instruments are reviewed tend to systematically unravel carefully negotiated deals in a 
direction that favors right holders. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS 
and the Dynamics of International Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95, 119–21 
(2004). See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New 
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2004) (“In 
the case of intellectual property rights, developing countries and their allies are shifting 
negotiations to international regimes whose institutions, actors, and subject matter mandates 
are more closely aligned with these countries’ interests . . . challenging established legal 
prescriptions and generating new principles, norms, and rules of intellectual property 
protection . . . .”). 
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coupled with excessive privatization of global public goods, could 
instead make both competition and innovation more difficult.164 
To put this another way, patent law’s raison d’être is to 
encourage the production of novelty and inventiveness. Its success 
means that there will always be new problems to solve. It makes little 
sense to preclude the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of 
Justice, and their equivalents elsewhere, along with national agencies 
and legislatures—all of which have shown themselves capable of 
creating law responsive to new circumstances—from offering their 
contributions to the evolution of the future patent system. 
III.  NURTURING AN INCIPIENT TRANSNATIONAL  
SYSTEM OF INNOVATION 
Of course, if trade is relatively free and creativity flourishes, 
some international coordination of the patent system becomes a 
necessity. But instead of premature substantive harmonization, what 
an integrated world economy needs is a method for lowering the costs 
that discrepancies in national laws impose on international actors and 
a system that will gradually enable innovators in all countries to reach 
the world market by means that are geared to their different national 
and regional capabilities and endowments.165 The trick, then, is to 
decide which laws actually need some modest degree of 
harmonization and to find a mechanism for revising the law as new 
coordination problems crop up. 
New measures are urgently needed at the prosecution stage. The 
priority rules of the Paris Convention, coupled with the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty and other procedural advances,166 move the 
 
 164. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 19 (suggesting that a “knowledge cartel” 
pushes “governments to regulate the global market in ways that lock in temporary competitive 
advantages without necessarily advancing the global public interest in innovation, competition, 
or the provision of complementary public goods” and reasoning that “representatives of the 
global public interest are unlikely to be seated at the table where hard-law negotiations take 
place”). 
 165. See id. at 33 (“All countries could benefit from a functionally efficient transnational 
system of innovation if low barriers to entry enabled entrepreneurs anywhere to invest in the 
production and distribution of knowledge goods.”); see also KEITH E. MASKUS, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, REFORMING U.S. PATENT POLICY: GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT 8, 
38 (2006) (“The needs of innovation will be better served by a more flexible—and better 
enforced—global regime than by the harmonization agenda being pushed by U.S. trade 
negotiators.”). 
 166. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 12, art. 4; see 
supra text accompanying notes 7–9. 
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system in a direction that makes serial applications easier to 
accomplish. Nonetheless, modest harmonization of the standards of 
patentability could dramatically lower private costs and make work 
sharing among national patent offices feasible.167 It is not, however, 
necessary to rely on top-down negotiation at WIPO; beneficial moves 
toward a more unified approach could be made even in the face of a 
moratorium on new international lawmaking.168 After all, when the 
advantages of a particular rule become evident, nations often tend to 
voluntarily conform their law to that rule. For example, with the 
exception of the United States, every country has acquiesced in 
awarding priority on a first-to-file basis;169 the United States is 
considering the absolute novelty standard in use elsewhere;170 and 
there is discussion (and some action) outside the United States to 
introduce a grace period similar to that found in American law.171 
Cooperation at the level of government agencies and courts can 
achieve significant moves toward coordination.172 These mechanisms 
are well known in international law generally and are taking hold in 
transnational patent law as well. For example, the European, 
Japanese, and U.S. patent offices regularly hold trilateral meetings to 
discuss sets of representative cases and to identify differences in 
examination practice. When law permits, the offices iron out their 
differences, so that they can examine applications using the same 
 
 167. See John G. Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention for the Acquisition and 
Enforcement of International Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 958, 963 
(2006) (“This article revisits the long known problem of the doctrine of territoriality” and 
“proposes an alternative transnational model using as a basis the de facto regional approach of 
Europe.”). 
 168. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 30, at 36–39 (calling for such a moratorium). 
 169. Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive 
Requirements of Patent Law, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,409, 15,410 (Mar. 19, 2001). 
 170. For an example of proposed legislation that would move the United States to first-to-
file and an absolute novelty standard, see supra note 98. 
 171. See Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 610–
11 (1994) (describing limited grace periods available in Japanese, Australian, and Canadian 
law); Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-To-Invent Principle From a 
Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 626–29, 663 (2002); see also infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and 
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 42–43 (1974); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global 
Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 1041, 1043 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 191, 191 (2003). See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND 
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) 
(compiling works discussing governance on a worldwide scale). 
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standards.173 Further coordination is achieved through examiner 
exchange programs174 and regular judicial forums at which patent-law 
judges can discuss common challenges that arise in their respective 
national jurisdictions.175 
Many post-grant issues could benefit from comprehensive 
international attention. For example, because patentees operate on a 
global scale, costly infringement suits on parallel patents have become 
common.176 Although different results remain technically possible (in 
that national patents are independent of one another177), inconsistent 
outcomes (in that different parties win in different locations) can 
complicate global marketing efforts. Some of these transnational 
cases have tempted courts to give extraterritorial effect to their own 
laws, a practice that can lead to multiple liabilities for the same harm 
and damage claims for acts that were legal in the territory where they 
were performed.178 
 
 173. See, e.g., Japan Patent Office, http://www.jpo.go.jp/index.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007) 
(showing examples of cooperative efforts by Japan and partner countries). 
 174. See, e.g., The Website of the Trilateral Co-operation, Projects, Use of Work Results, 
Exchange of Examiners, and Comparative Studies, http://www.trilateral.net/projects/use_of_ 
work_results (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). 
 175. See, e.g., Invitation to the Fourth International Judges Conference on Intellectual 
Property Law, Intellectual Prop. Owners Educ. Found., available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Past_Meetings_and_Events&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Con
tentFileID=6462 (announcing the schedule of conference events). 
 176. See John R. Thomas, Litigation beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative 
Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 291 (1996); 
see also Mills, supra note 167, at 989–96 (discussing a variety of disputes involving parallel 
patents). See generally European Max-Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Prop., 
supra note 5, at 196–97, 202 (proposing amendments to Regulation EC 44/2001 to ensure 
efficient enforcement of parallel intellectual property rights); sources cited supra note 6. 
 177. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 12, art. 4bis(1). 
 178. The Federal Circuit was particularly drawn to this tactic. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1367–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (applying 
U.S. patent law to the transfer of software onto foreign-assembled computers from “golden 
master” disks or electronic transmissions originating in the United States); Eolas Techs. Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1938–41 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (same). The Supreme Court has 
presumably ended this practice by reversing the AT&T case. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1759. 
Cf. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet 
Providers, File 29286, 2004 S.C.C. 45 (June 30, 2004), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/ 
en/2004/2004scc45/2004scc45.html (noting that the decision to find jurisdiction over an Internet 
service provider “raises the spectre of imposition of copyright duties on a single 
telecommunication in both the State of transmission and the State of reception,” and also noting 
that “as with other fields of overlapping liability . . . the answer lies in the making of 
international or bilateral agreements”). 
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Globalization has also created new opportunities for sharp 
practices. Examples include harassment of lawful users with 
successive suits179 and so-called “torpedo actions” that prevent the 
patentee from obtaining timely relief.180 In addition, because patents 
are territorial, infringers can spread their activities across several 
states and leave the patent holder with no single place where a court 
can find the patent to have been infringed.181  
Once again, top-down solutions are not necessarily the right 
approach. Another less radical response would permit parties in 
transnational cases to consolidate all their claims before a single 
tribunal or to coordinate multiple lawsuits through cooperation 
among the courts in which actions are pending. This would reduce 
costs, conserve court resources, reduce opportunities for harassment, 
and hopefully mitigate the extraterritorial impulse. Furthermore, as 
Professor Graeme Dinwoodie has suggested, courts hearing 
multijurisdictional cases may be positioned to find middle ground 
among disparate rules—that is, to further harmonization efforts 
through common-law adjudication.182 Although adjudicators have 
proved reluctant to forge new procedural approaches on their own,183 
several organizations are in the process of proposing guidelines and 
procedures that courts (or national governments) could adopt. Some 
apply to transnational litigation generally;184 others to intellectual 
 
 179. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(successive suits for infringing trade secrets brought in the United States and France not barred 
by res judicata). 
 180. Paul A. Coletti, No Relief in Sight: Difficulties in Obtaining Judgments in Europe Using 
EPO Issued Patents, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 351, 367 & n.89 (1999); Robin 
Jacob, International Intellectual Property Litigation in the Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 507, 511 (1999). 
 181. Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 117, 120–21 
(2005); Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope 
of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 281–82 (2007). 
 182. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create 
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 542–43 (2000). 
 183. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting attempt to 
consolidate U.S. and foreign patent claims); Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH 
& Co KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, [2006] F.S.R. 45 (E.C.J. 2006) 
(refusing to permit a German court to determine the consequences of allegedly patent-
infringing activity in France when the case required the determination of the validity of the 
French patent); cf. Case C-593/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, Goldenberg, [2007] F.S.R. 5 
(E.C.J. 2006) (refusing to permit a Dutch court to join foreign defendants to a patent 
infringement suit involving a resident defendant). 
 184. See, e.g., F. K. Juenger, The ILA Principles on Provisional and Protective Measures, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 941, 941 (1997); Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], International Civil and Commercial 
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property cases specifically.185 If one of these projects were to succeed, 
the experience generated would provide future advocates of 
harmonized patent law with data of extraordinary value. 
Even when a more centralized approach becomes propitious, 
questions will remain about the level at which harmonization should 
take place. Thus, the European Community has long been debating 
the merits of instituting a Community Patent and other regions are 
considering similar projects.186 The United States, Europe, Japan, and 
other industrialized countries have discussed the possibility of 
creating a “limited package” instrument.187 These initiatives differ 
from the SPLT negotiations in a significant way. Because they involve 
nations that are similar economically and technologically, there is no 
need to compromise on rules that are, in fact, optimum for no one. If 
such arrangements were to move forward, broader harmonization 
might eventually trickle down, as nations reaching the technological 
frontier decided to voluntarily join an existing regime. 
Finally, there are advantages to giving the system established 
under the TRIPS Agreement more time to evolve.188 The 
 
Litigation, ILA Res. No. 1/2000 (July 25–29, 2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Civil% 
20&%20Commercial%20Litigation/RESlitigation.pdf; Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 
1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf; Hague Conf. on Private Int’l 
Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, available at http://pub.bna.com/ 
eclr/hagueconvention063005.pdf. 
 185. AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, 
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, approved May 14, 2007 
(forthcoming 2008); Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 1065–66. The Max Planck Institute is 
also working on an International Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments. 
Annette Kur, Applicable Law: An Alternative Proposal for International Regulation—The Max-
Planck Project on International Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 951 
(2005); see also Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop. [AIPPI], supra note 5, at 827 
(resolving that “courts of a given country should be allowed to make a ruling over infringing 
acts regarding certain intellectual property rights, which have taken place in any other 
country”); Yoav Oestreicher, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Intellectual Property 
Judgments: Analysis and Guidelines for a New International Convention 10 (2004) 
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Duke University School of Law), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=939093 (proposing a minimalist international intellectual property convention to solve 
the world community’s continuing inability to regulate the field). The European Union has also 
had a European Patent Litigation Agreement under consideration. Draft Agreement on the 
Establishment of a European Patent Litigation System, supra note 10. 
 186. See supra note 9. 
 187. Industrialized Countries to Seek Deal on Global Patent Treaty Outside WIPO, 72 Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1788, at 606 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
 188. The Council for TRIPS bears responsibility for monitoring TRIPS implementation 
issues. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 68. There are also nongovernmental 
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international intellectual property community would learn a great 
deal from examining how well emerging economies adapt to the 
minimum standards TRIPS sets out, from scrutinizing the decisions of 
the WTO’s dispute-settlement apparatus,189 and from observing how 
WTO Members cope with TRIPS mistakes, such as the one solved in 
the Doha round.190 
As drafted, TRIPS has some of the features that a responsive 
harmonized law needs. It has a dispute resolution system that could 
be used to keep the law current and, as the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health demonstrated, a quasi-
legislative body able to make larger corrections.191 It is worth waiting 
to see how well these existing mechanisms deal with the problems 
challenging the international patent community. 
As it stands, however, the TRIPS Agreement is not a final 
answer to the problem of harmonizing global patent law. The regime 
lacks a solid legislative basis for adjusting intellectual property law to 
changing needs. Despite precatory statements about the need for 
balance,192 the Agreement focuses solely on the producer end of the 
equation and does not establish user rights. Thus, it includes no way 
for the parties to strike, at the international level, the balance 
between proprietary and access interests that good patent law 
 
organizations that follow international intellectual property policy making. See, e.g., Intellectual 
Property Watch, http://ip-watch.org/index.php?res=1024&print=0 (last visited Oct. 4, 2007); 
Médecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF), Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/index.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2007); Knowledge Ecology 
International (KEI), http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2007). 
 189. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22, 
Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1126 (1994). 
 190. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also MASKUS, supra note 165, at 7 
(recommending “a formal complaint at the WTO that specific countries have failed to meet 
their enforcement obligations under TRIPS.”); Marianne Levin & Annette Kur, Special Session 
at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and 
Research in Intellectual Property: Towards More Balanced, User-Friendly Paradigms in IP 
Law: A Project Reform of TRIPS (Sept. 5, 2006) (spearheading a proposal to amend the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 191. See, e.g., Doha Declaration, supra note 37 (mandating further negotiations). See 
generally GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN 
LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000); Abbott, supra note 48 
(commenting on the implementation of the Doha Declaration). 
 192. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 7; see id., pmbl. & art. 8(1). 
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requires.193 Although dispute resolution panels have hinted that their 
charge includes making normative assessments of the legitimate 
expectations of patentees—a procedure that could, in theory, develop 
a series of user rights—these panels have looked no further than a 
narrow reading of existing rules protecting user interests.194 They 
articulate nothing like the normative vision required of a dynamic 
system, capable of responding to new situations. 
Arguably, a properly functioning patent law also requires 
competition law safeguards. The TRIPS Agreement permits 
Members to control anticompetitive abuse, but it does not mandate 
such control.195 If WIPO intends to proceed with the SPLT, it would 
do well to consider what sorts of user safeguards are needed, to 
determine whether it is viable to separate the regime that creates 
exclusive rights from the regime that controls monopolies, and to 
develop experience and consensus regarding the delicate intersection 
 
 193. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New 
Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 214 (2006) 
(advocating the inclusion of “substantive maxima” in the TRIPS Agreement to provide balance 
to the international intellectual property system). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004) (“The TRIPS 
Agreement . . . is structured to directly protect the rights of intellectual property holders . . . 
[but] does little . . . to explicitly safeguard the interests of those who seek to use protected 
works.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, supra 
note 125, ¶ 7.56 (finding an exemption permitting the testing of patented pharmaceuticals for 
regulatory review purposes to be normatively appropriate (without stockpiling) but only 
because many members already had experimental use exceptions in their patent laws); 
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 435 (“WTO panels tend to hew closely to text when 
resolving disputes.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel 
Decision and the “Three Step Test” for Copyright Exemptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE 
DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 49 (2001) (arguing that the United States–Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, WTR/DS/160/R (WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 2000) case sought only to 
“anticipate what the empirical situation [would] be, [rather] than [provide] an explanation of 
what the right holder’s markets should cover”). 
 195. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 31(k); see id. art. 8(2); Mark D. Janis, “Minimal” 
Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 23, at 774, 776–78; Ullrich, supra note 159, at 731–35. 
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between these two bodies of law,196 with due regard to the needs of 
countries at different levels of development.197 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that any efforts to achieve deep 
harmonization of world patent law at the present time, such as those 
contemplated by the SPLT, are both premature and 
counterproductive. The evidence shows, instead, that the worldwide 
intellectual property system has entered a brave new scientific epoch, 
in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas about how best 
to treat a daunting array of emerging new technologies. The existing 
system has become increasingly dysfunctional because it operates 
with a set of rudimentary working hypotheses that have not kept pace 
with technical change. As different countries put these hypotheses to 
the test, the focus of international lawmakers—whether at WIPO, the 
WTO, or in a trilateral coalition—should be on gaining experience 
and data from living within the parameters set out by the TRIPS 
Agreement during a prolonged period of open-minded 
experimentation. 
If international policymakers rise above sectarian interests and 
power politics to concentrate on nurturing the incipient transnational 
system of innovation that the TRIPS Agreement brought into being, 
they can stimulate research and innovation on a grander scale than 
ever before. But they must take the time and invest the effort to get it 
right. Locking in the fleeting, competitive advantages of one group of 
stakeholders or another at the expense of real innovators and 
dynamic entrepreneurs everywhere is a bad strategy that will 
compromise the world’s aggregate innovative capacity in the long run. 
Instead of moving forward with harmonization for its own sake, the 
 
 196. GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: THE 
INNOVATION NEXUS 99–115 (2007); see Emanuella Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the 
Crossroad between Monopolization and Abuse of a Dominant Position: American and European 
Approaches Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455, 477–94 (2006). 
 197. See Drexl, supra note 159, at 709, 720 (“[R]elevant product markets usually have a 
limited geographical scope. Whereas intangible goods protected by IPRs may be exploited 
worldwide, the geographical market for products based on such IPRs is not necessarily a global 
one. . . . For instance, in poorer countries that are net importers of agricultural goods, small 
farmers will not compete with farmers on foreign markets.”); Ullrich, supra note 159, at 40 
(“Community and national protection must be seen as complimentary parts of an overall system 
of protection, where unification and harmonization allow to balance uniformity with specificity 
and stability with flexibility of protection.”). 
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international intellectual property community must first identify and 
test trustworthy, empirically supportable solutions likely to benefit 
humanity at large. 
